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STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS
THE SOUTH CAROLINA LIMITED LIABILrrY COMPANY ACT OF 1994
I. INTRODUCTION

The 1994 session of the South Carolina General Assembly placed South
Carolina on the roster of states that have adopted some form of limited liability
company act.I Modeled after the November 1992 draft of the ABA Prototype
Act, 2 the South Carolina Limited Liability Company Act3 (Act) provides an
attractive new option for lawyers and business organizers. Although the
Limited Liability Company (LLC) has existed in the United States since
1977, 4 only in the last six years has it become available in most states. Much
has been written by scholars and students about this new business form,5 yet
little case law has developed. This survey first examines the South Carolina
Act, providing a brief overview and comparing specific provisions to those of
other business forms. Second, it explores the liability that may be imposed
upon members through application of the common-law doctrine of "piercing
the corporate veil."
II. OVERVIEW OF THE LLC

ACT

An LLC may be formed by two or more persons6 by filing articles of
organization with the Secretary of State.' The articles need only contain the
name of the LLC, the address of the initial registered office and the name of

1. According to a recent report, as of February 10, 1995, 47 states and the District of
Columbia have enacted a limited liability company act. Legislation was pending in the remaining
three states. Bus. L. TODAY, March/April 1995, at 57.
2. The Prototype Act is reprinted in 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE,
RiBsTE N & KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILrrY COMPANIEs app. B. (1992).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-43-101 to -1409 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
4. Wyoming was the first state to adopt this business form. See WYO. STAT. §§ 17-15-101
to -136 (1977).
5. For an in-depth discussion of generic limited liability companies, see Thomas E. Geu,
Understandingthe LimitedLiability Company:A Basic ComparativePrimer(PartOne), 37 S.D.
L. REv. 44 (1991-92); Thomas E. Geu, Understandingthe Limited Liability Company: A Basic
ComparativePrimer(PartTwo), 37 S.D. L. REv. 467 (1991-92); Robert R. Keatinge et al., The
Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAw. 375 (1992); RiBsTEIN
& KEATINGE, supra note 2.
6. Under the Act, a "person" is defined as "an individual, a general partnership, a limited
partnership, a domestic or foreign limited liability company, a trust, an estate, an association, a
corporation, or any other legal entity." S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-102(M) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1994).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-201 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
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the registered agent, the date of dissolution, an election of whether the
company will be member- or manager-managed, and the name and signature
of each initial member.' The filing of the articles with the Secretary of State
is conclusive proof of the formation of the LLC.9 Unlike the Uniform
Partnership Act, the Act does not require that an LLC file an annual renewal
application. 10
While the Act contains many default provisions that govern the relationship, rights, and duties of the members, the statute is far less complete than
the Business Corporations Act. Therefore, in most cases members will enter
into an operating agreement that further defines the relationship and serves
much the same function as the bylaws of a corporation or a partnership
agreement. The default provisions provided in the Act are intended, in many
instances, to protect the partnership tax status of the LLC. Thus, drafters of
operating agreements should carefully consider the tax implications of
modifying the statutory provisions. The operating agreement becomes the
primary governing document of the LLC; where optional provisions of the
articles of organization are inconsistent therewith, the operating agreement
prevails. "
The Act sets forth several types of documents that must be maintained by
the LLC at its principal place of business.12 Nevertheless, consistent with the
notion of simplifying formalities, the Act specifically provides that failure to
keep any of the required records "shall not be grounds for imposing liability
on any member or manager for the debts and obligations of the limited liability
company." 3
Perhaps the most compelling reason for forming an LLC rather than a
corporation is the availability of partnership tax status. Profits of a corporation are taxed twice before inuring to the benefit of a shareholder--once at the
corporate level, and again at the personal level after distribution. The
subchapter S election is meant to allow small businesses to avoid this double
taxation, but is fraught with restrictions that limit its application. 4 Under the
Act, the earnings of an LLC are taxed only once, at the individual level.
This partnership tax status is available if an LLC exhibits no more than
two of four corporate characteristics: centralized management, continuity of

8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-202(A)(1)-(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
9. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-43-201, -206(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
10. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-1110(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994) with S.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-43-202(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-202(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-405(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43405(E) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
14. For example, to be eligible for subchapter S status, a corporation may have no more than
35 shareholders, who must all reside within the state of incorporation. See generally I.R.C.
§§ 1361-1399 (1986 & Supp. 1995).
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life, free transferability of interest, or limited liability.' 5 To prevent the LLC
from being classified as a corporation for tax purposes, the drafters of the
South Carolina Act have attempted to make the statute "semi-bulletproof."16
The election to form an LLC by definition establishes the limited liability
characteristic of the company. Furthermore, the drafters have assumed that
in most cases a second characteristic, centralized management, will be
established by the election to have the company be manager-managed.17
To prevent a "third strike," the Act imposes restrictions on the duration
of the LLC and the transferability of an interest in the LLC. When forming
an LLC, the members must specify a date on which the company will
automatically dissolve."8 The Act also specifies certain events that will
trigger the dissolution of the company. 9 While the remaining members may
choose to continue the business, this election may only be made within ninety
days of dissolution.' Furthermore, the Act restricts the ability of members
to transfer their interests. An assignee of an LLC interest may become a
member only upon unanimous consent of the other members at the time of the
assignment.2 The restrictions on duration and transferability may not be
altered by any ex ante written agreement of the members.
Another significant feature of the LLC is the liability shield provided to
members. A member of an LLC, simply by reason of membership, is not
liable for obligations of the company that arise in "contract, tort, or otherwise."' As to professional service companies, however, the rule is limited,
allowing a member of an LLC that provides professional services to become
liable for his personal negligence and for the negligence of others if "he is at
fault in appointing, supervising, or cooperating with them. "23 The Act does
envision, and in some cases provides for, acts by a member which will expose
him to liability. Furthermore, while the statute does not directly address the
issue, some scholars believe that the common-law principles of piercing the

15. Treasury Regulation§ 301.7701-2(a)(3)states that "[a]n unincorporatedorganizationshall
not be classified as an associationunless such organization has more corporate characteristics than
noncorporate characteristics." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1993). This
provision is often referred to as the "three-strike rule."
16. Martin C. McWilliams, Jr., Limited Liability Companies - A New Item on South
Carolina'sBusiness Menu, S.C. LAW., Sept./Oct. 1994, at 23, 24.
17. Id. at 24.
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-202(A)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
19. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-43-802, -901.1 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-901(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-706(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-304(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
23. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-304(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994). This provision almost
duplicates that of the Professional Corporations Act. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-19-340 (Law.
Co-op. 1990).
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corporate veil will be applied to LLCs in a manner similar to that applied to
corporations. 24
III. MEMBERSHIP, RIGHTS, AND DUTIES: A COMPARISON
OF THE

LLC ACT AND RELATED SOUTH CAROLINA STATUTES

The Limited Liability Company suffers a bit of an identity crisis. Rather
than being a purely unique business form, the LLC is a hybrid of the corporate
and partnership forms.' Various traits of each "parent" are evident in the
LLC Act, some appearing almost unmodified, some showing the effects of
cross-breeding. In many ways, organization under the Act creates an entity
that looks like a corporation to the outside world, but to the members, looks
like a partnership. Unlike the partnership and the corporation, there is no
common-law ancestor of the LLC. This lack of a common-law heritage
further amplifies the identity problem of the LLC.
An individual may become a member of an LLC in two ways: by
acquiring an interes 21 directly from the company or indirectly from another
member. To acquire a membership interest directly from the company, one
must either comply with the relevant provisions of the operating agreement or
receive unanimous consent of all the members.2 7 In order for one to become
a member through assignment, the members must unanimously consent to the
assignment at the time the assignment is made.' Unlike the requirements
under the direct method, the requirement of unanimous consent may not be
modified by the operating agreement or agreed to in advance of the assignment. This rigidity in the statute is intended to prevent the free transferability
of interest in an LLC, a characteristic deemed corporate by the Internal
Revenue Service. 9
The membership requirements incorporate parts of both the Business
Corporation Act30 (BCA) and the Uniform Partnership Act3' (UPA). Under
the UPA, an individual may become a member of a partnership only with the

24. For a discussion of potential liability of members, see infra Part IV.

25. See Sandra K. Miller, What Standards of Conduct Should Apply to Members and
Managers of Limited Liability Companies?, 68 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 21, 32-36 (1994);
McWilliams, supra note 16, at 23.
26. Like a partnership, there is a bifurcation of an LLC interest and membership. An LLC
interest is merely a "right to share in profits and losses, and right to share in distributions," S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-43-102(H) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994), and may be obtained through
assignment, S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-704 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-801(A)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-706(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
29. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying discussion.
30. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-1-101 to -20-105 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1994).
31. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-41-10 to -1220 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1994).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol47/iss1/14

4

et al.: Statutory Developments

1995]

STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS

unanimous consent of all the members, as modified in the partnership
agreement.2 Under the BCA, an interest, or share, of the corporation is
freely transferable, except to the extent restricted by the articles of incorporation, the bylaws, or a shareholder agreement.3" Unlike the transfer of a
corporate share, assignment of a partnership interest does not convey all of the
rights of a partner.34 The Act allows a complete transfer of interest, but only
upon the consent of the other members.
The rights which inure to the interest holders of the various organizations
differ. The BCA provides that, in total, the shareholders of a corporation
must have at least the right to vote and to receive net assets upon dissolution.35 The UPA provides three specific rights of a partner:36 (1) rights in
specific partnership property,37 (2) the right to share in the profits and
surplus,38 and (3) the right to participate in management. 39 Article 4 of the
Act sets forth the rights of LLC members, primarily the right to manage and
the right to vote.
An LLC may be managed by some or all of the members, or by
professional managers. The right to manage the company is vested equally in
each member, unless the articles of organization delegate this function to
managers or the operating agreement provides otherwise.' ° If the articles
vest management in managers, the right of managers is exclusive, subject to
limitations imposed by the operating agreement. The operating agreement may
further modify the statutory provisions by setting forth the method of election
and removal of the managers, defining who may be a manager, and establishing the term of office of the management.41
The shareholders of a corporation do not have a right to manage the
corporation, but rather, this right is statutorily granted to the directors.42
While this right may be modified by the articles of incorporation or an
agreement among the shareholders,43 the typical corporation is managed by

32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-510(7) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-6-270 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
34. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-740 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
35. Because a corporation may issue more than one class of shares, the rights of any particular
class of shares may be strictly limited. However, among the various classes, these two rights
must be present. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-6-101(b) (Law. Co-op. 1990); see also S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 33-7-210 (Law. Co-op. 1990) (outlining the voting entitlement of shares).
36. These rights are enumerated in § 33-41-710.See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-710 (Law. Coop. 1990).
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-720 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
38. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-730 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-510(5) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-401(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-401(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-101(c) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
43. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-8-101, 33-18-200(h) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
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a board of directors unless the board has been dispensed with altogether.
Under the UPA, each partner has an equal right in the management of the
partnership subject to modification by the partnership agreement.' The Act
falls closer to the UPA by initially giving the members equal rights to manage,
but allowing delegation; under the BCA, the right to manage must be
withdrawn from the directors.
Concomitant with the right to manage is the ability to act as an agent for
the company. Except when the right to manage has been given to managers,
each member of an LLC is an agent of the LLC for carrying on the business
of the company.45 This section of the Act almost duplicates that of the
UPA. 4 By comparison, no shareholder or director is, by virtue of being
such, an agent of the corporation.
Like the right to manage, the right to vote on certain matters may also be
delegated to managers and may be modified by a written operating agreement.
The default provisions of the Act give members the right to vote on "any
matter connected with the business of the limited liability company." 47 In
contrast to a corporation managed by directors, in order for a vote to carry,
it must be affirmed by more than half of the members.48 The Act is thus
more like the UPA, which requires the approval of a majority of the partners
in "ordinary matters connected with the partnership business. " 49
Under the Act, in order to amend the operating agreement or take any
action in contravention of the agreement, there must be unanimous consent or
approval of all of the members." This provision may be modified only by
a written agreement of the members.5 By comparison, the bylaws of a
corporation may be amended by an affirmative vote of a majority of either the
board of directors or the shareholders. 2
The duties of a member, mostly borrowed from the UPA, include a duty
of loyalty, a duty of care, and a duty of good faith and fair dealing.5 3 A

44. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-510(5) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
45. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-301 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
46. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-310 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
47. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-403(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
48. Id.
49. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-510(8) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
50. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-403(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
51. Id. This provision can be read to imply that in most cases an operating agreement need
not be in writing.
52. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-10-200 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
53. While the South Carolina statute is more specific on this subject than that of some other
states, many questions remain unresolved regarding application of common law. For a general
discussion, see Steven C. Bahls, Application of CorporateCommon Law Doctrines to Limited
Liability Companies, 55 MONT. L. REv. 43 (1994); Miller, supra note 25, at 21; Elizabeth M.
McGeever, HazardousDuty?: The Role of the Fiduciary in NoncorporateStructures, BUS. L.
TODAY, Mar./Apr. 1995, at 51.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol47/iss1/14

6

et al.: Statutory Developments
1995]

STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS

member's duty of loyalty is set forth in section 33-43-402 of the Act. The
duty of loyalty includes the duty to account to the company for profits gained
as a result of membership in the company, to refrain from acting for an
adverse party dealing with the company, and to refrain from competing with
the company. However, a member does not breach this duty simply by
furthering his own interest. 4 These duties may not be eliminated, even by
unanimous written consent of all the members. However, members may
define in the operating agreement or articles of organization what conduct is
permitted, so long as it is not manifestly unreasonable. 5
Under the Act, members engaging in management are prohibited from
"engaging in grossly negligent conduct, intentional misconduct, and knowing
violation of the law." 56 This definition of care provided by the Act is similar
to the level of care that is required of directors and officers of corporations 7
under the business judgment rule.5" Like the other duties, the duty of care
may not be diminished, even with the unanimous consent of the members. 9
Borrowing further from principles of agency, the Act requires that members
discharge their duties to the company with good faith and fair dealing.' This
duty is extended to require similar behavior toward fellow members. 6'
While the liability of a member of an LLC is limited, a member is clearly
not absolved from all liability associated with the entity. Members may
become personally liable in four ways: (1) intentional personal torts;
(2) wrongful distributions; (3) failure to make contributions; and (4) claims by
creditors after dissolution.
The Act states that no member "solely by reason of being a member or
being a manager" will be liable for obligations of the LLC. 62 However, a
member can clearly cause himself to become liable to a third person either in
contract, by waiving the statutory protection, or in tort, through personal
negligence.

54. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-402(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
55. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-402(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-402(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
57. The general duties of directors and officers of corporations are set forth in §§ 33-8-300(a)
to -410. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-300(a) to -410 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
58. For examples of the application of the business judgment rule in South Carolina, see
Goddard v. Fairways Dev. Gen. Partnership, _ S.C. _, 426 S.E.2d 828 (Ct. App. 1993);
DocksideAss'n v. Detyens, 294 S.C. 86, 362 S.E.2d 874, aff'g, 291 S.C. 214, 352 S.E.2d 714
(Ct. App. 1987).
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-402(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-402(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
61. Id. It is likely that the duty of good faith and fair dealing will be applied with the same
strictness as that applied to partnerships under Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y.
1928). See Miller, supra note 25, at 45-49. The duties of a member to other members may be
analogous to those imposed by the courts in corporate shareholder relations.
62. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-304(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
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It is anticipated that most LLCs, like most corporations, will be held by
a small number of members63 and will have few assets, at least at formation.
As has been the accepted practice for closely held corporations, lenders will
almost always require that one or more members co-sign or guarantee any
obligation of the LLC. If the LLC defaults on the obligation, the member
cannot then seek the protection of the Act to shield him from liability.
Additionally, the maxim that each person is liable for his or her own torts
is also applicable in this setting. A member of an LLC, having committed a
tort, may not hide behind the LLC shield, even if the negligent acts were done
in performing the business of the corporation, were ratified by the LLC, or
were within the scope of the agency relationship. This does not represent any
change from the law under the BCA or the UPA.
A member may be liable to the LLC for any wrongful distribution for
which the member votes or assents.6 This liability apparently may be
imposed regardless of whether the member received anything in the distribution.6 This liability is limited somewhat by the showing requirements levied
on a plaintiff seeking to impose such liability: a member will only be held
liable if it is shown that the distribution was in violation of section 33-43-604
or the operating agreement and that the member breached a fiduciary duty as
defined in section 33-43-402 in approving the distribution. 66 The liability of
a member is further limited in that contribution may be sought from other
members who could also be held liable or from those who received the
improper distribution.67
Upon the formation of the LLC, the members will agree on the contributions that will be made by each member in return for their interest in the
company. These may take the form of immediate transfers of assets to the
company or of promises to transfer assets or provide services in the future.68
A creditor who extends credit to the LLC with knowledge and in reliance on
these promises of contributions, may enforce the obligation if such has been
reduced to writing. 69 The member's liability will be limited to the amount
due under the obligation.7"

63. See Bahls, supra note 53, at 46-53; Keatinge, supra note 5, at 395; Miller, supranote 25,
at 66-70.
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-605(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
65. The requirements for a proper distribution are set out in § 33-43-604. These requirements
are copied almost verbatim from the BCA and include both a cash flow and a balance sheet test.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-6-400(c) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
66. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-605(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
67. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-605(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
68. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-501 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
69. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-502(E) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
70. A similar provision is contained in the BCA. It is unclear, however, whether the right
under the BCA extends only to those creditors who act in reliance on the promise of future
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A member of an LLC may be liable to creditors with allowed claims after
the dissolution of the company.7" In this case, a member is liable to the
extent of the lesser of his pro rata share of the distribution of the assets of the
corporation, or the amount actually distributed to him. In total, the member
72
will not be liable for claims in excess of the total distribution received.
IV. PIERCING THE VEIL

The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is among the most uncertain
in the area of corporate law. 73 This uncertainty results primarily from a lack
of articulable standards by which the doctrine is to be applied.74 This
uncertainty will only increase under the Act as courts are called upon to
interpret its provisions and apply the piercing doctrine to the LLC. To date,
no case law has developed to guide courts or practitioners in the application
of this common-law doctrine.75 Only Colorado has statutorily provided a
method for the application of this doctrine to a LLC, stating that the courts
should apply the same standard as that for a corporation. 76
A properly-functioning LLC should appear to the outside world as any
incorporated organization. If creditors and other third parties regard an LLC
in the same manner that they do a corporation, then they should be similarly
protected from insider abuse. On this basis, the ability to pierce the veil of
the LLC should not be substantially increased or diminished because the
organizers have chosen an LLC over a corporation as their business vehicle.

contribution. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-6-220(a) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
71. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-908 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
72. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-908(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
73. For a general discussion of the many approaches taken by various jurisdictions, see
ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATIONS § 2.4. (1986). See also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89 (1985).
74. Circuit Judge Russell commented:
The circumstances which have been considered significant by the courts in actions to
disregard the corporate fiction have been "rarely articulated with any clarity."
Perhaps this is true because the circumstances "necessarily vary according to the
circumstances of each case," and every case where the issue is raised is to be
regarded as "sui generis... [to] be decided in accordance with its own underlying
facts."
DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681,684 (4th Cir. 1976)
(footnotes and citations omitted).
75. See Bahls, supra note 53, at 60-66; Susan P. Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A
Possible Choicefor Doing Business?, 41 FLA. L. REv. 721, 744 (1989); Keatinge, supra note
5, at 445-47; Ann Maxey, West Virginia's Limited Liability Company Act: Problems With the
Act, 96 W. VA. L. REV.905, 948-61 (1994).
76. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-107 (Supp. 1994).
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The purpose of the corporate shield is well understood and respected.
The United States Supreme Court has pointed out the significance of the
corporate form, and its attendant liability shield, stating:
[n]ormally the corporation is an insulator from liability on claims of
creditors. The fact that incorporation was desired in order to obtain
limited liability does not defeat that purpose. Limited liability is the rule
not the exception; and on that assumption large undertakings are7 rested,
vast enterprises are launched, and huge sums of capital attracted.
Even so, the Court recognized that this shield ought not be impenetrable.
Quoting Chief Judge Cardozo, the Court warned that limited liability may be
denied "when the sacrifice is so essential to the end that some accepted public
policy may be defended or upheld.""8
The South Carolina courts have also acknowledged the importance of the
7
corporate liability shield and the limitations upon it. In Sturkie v. Sfly"
the
court stated:
[i]f any general rule can be laid down, it is that a corporation will be
looked upon as a legal entity until sufficient reason to the contrary appears;
but when the notion of legal entity is used to protect fraud, justify wrong,
or defeat public policy,
the law will regard the corporation as an associas0
tion of persons.
Nevertheless, this doctrine "is not to be applied without substantial reflection."'

The standards for piercing were established by the Fourth Circuit in
DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co.,' and further

77. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 361-62 (1944) (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 362 (quoting Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926)).
79. 280 S.C. 453, 313 S.E.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1984).
80. 280 S.C. at 457, 313 S.E.2d at 318. Prior to Sturkie, the Fourth Circuit, applying South
Carolina law, stated:
This concept of separate entity is merely a legal theory, "introduced for purposes of
convenienceand to subserve the ends ofjustice," and the courts "decline to recognize
[it] whenever recognition of the corporate form would extend the principle of
incorporation 'beyond its legitimate purposes, and [would] produce injustices or
inequitable consequences.'"
DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. V. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 683 (4th Cir. 1976)
(footnote omitted) (citing Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483
F.2d 1098, 1106, modifiedfactually, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1973); Sell v. United States, 336
F.2d 467, 472 (10th Cir. 1964); Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 284, 288-89 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 635 (1942) and Jennings v. Automobile Sales Co., 107 S.C. 514, 93 S.E. 188 (1917)).
81. Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 457, 313 S.E.2d at 318.
82. 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976).
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developed by the South Carolina Court of Appeals in Sturkie v. Sifly. 3
Under the DeWitt-Sturkie analysis, the standard to be applied is a two-pronged
test.' "The first part of the test, an eight-factor analysis, looks to observance of the corporate formalities by the dominant shareholders. The second
part requires that there be an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness
if the acts of the corporation be not regarded as the acts of individuals. "I
The application of this doctrine to an LLC requires an understanding of
two fundamental principles: the "separateness" of an LLC as a legal entity
and the principal-agent relationship of an LLC to its members. It is well
settled that "a corporation is an entity, separate and distinct from its officers
and stockholders."86 An LLC should equally be recognized as a legal entity,
separate and distinct from its members. Some commentators have expressed
some reservations concerning whether LLCs are conclusively separate
entities.' Professor Keatinge, for example, points out that only Virginia has
specifically defined an LLC as an "entity.""8 While the South Carolina
statute has defined an LLC as an "organization" 9 rather than an "entity,"
there is no indication elsewhere in the statute that the legislature intended for
an LLC to be anything but a separate entity. Indeed, the Act provides that an
LLC "shall possess and may exercise all the powers and privileges as an
individual that are either necessary or convenient."' The Act specifically
allows an LLC to93 own property, 91 transfer property, 92 and sue and be sued
in its own name.
The second fundamental principle bearing on a piercing analysis is that
members, simply by being members, are agents of the LLC unless their ability
to act is limited by an operating agreement.' Accordingly, members have
the power to act on behalf of the company in carrying on the business of the
LLC. This relationship also allows third parties to rely on negotiations with
a member on behalf of an LLC as binding on the organization. Unless a
member, by some affirmative act, indicates to a third party that the member
is not acting for the LLC, the LLC should be bound by the third party's
reliance.

83. 280 S.C. 453, 313 S.E.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1984).

84. Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 457-58, 313 S.E.2d at 318.
85. Id. at 457-58, 313 S.E.2d at 318 (citing DeWitt, 540 F.2d at 685).
86. DeWitt, 540 F.2d at 683.
87. See, e.g., Keatinge, supra note 5, at 406-07.
88. Id.
89. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-102(G) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
90. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-106 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
91. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-701 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
92. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-702 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
93. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-1201(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
94. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-301(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
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Because the statutory requirements imposed on LLCs are different from
those required of corporations, rote application of DeWiftt-Sturkie is inappropriate.9 First, the absence of corporate formalities and records is almost
presumed under the Act. The Act states, for example, that lack of records
"shall not be grounds for imposing liability on any member or manager for the
debts and obligations of the limited liability company." 9' Moreover, the Act
envisions that an LLC will be dominated by its members by expressly granting
the members the right to manage the business. 7 Accordingly, piercing on
basis of dominance also seems inappropriate.
As the above analysis demonstrates, the eight factor DeWitt-Sturkie test
should be replaced with an analytic methodology more appropriate to this
newer business form. The determination of whether an LLC should be pierced
might better be made, for example, by considering the two fundamental
principles set forth above: whether the members have treated the LLC as a
separate legal entity and whether the members have behaved as agents of the
LLC.
How should a court determine if an LLC should be treated as a separate
legal entity? Relevant factors here might include whether the LLC has
observed the formalities required of an LLC under the Act; whether the
members have maintained separate funds and accounts from those of the LLC
and whether separate books and records were kept; whether the LLC was
properly capitalized for its business purpose; and, if the LLC is principally
owned by another entity, whether the two share common management and
members. In determining whether the principal-agent relationship envisioned
by the Act is intact, a court could consider whether the management of the
business has been dominated by a single member in contravention of an
operating agreement; whether the members hold the business out as the
principal for whom they are acting; whether members have usurped the power
of managers in a manager-managed company; and whether a member has
observed the duties owed to the LLC in carrying on its business.

95. The first prong of DeWitt-Sturkie involves the consideration of eight factors. If a court
finds that a sufficient number exist, then the corporate form has been ignored by the shareholders
and sufficient justification for piercing the veil exists. The eight factors are:
(1) whether the corporation was grossly undercapitalized; (2) failure to observe
corporate formalities; (3) non-payment of dividends; (4) insolvency of the debtor
corporation at the time; (5)siphoning of funds of the corporation by the dominant
stockholder; (6) non-functioning of other officers or directors; (7) absence of
corporate records; and (8) the fact that the corporation was merely a facade for the
operations of the dominant stockholder.
Cumberland Wood Prods., Inc. v. Bennett, 308 S.C. 268, 271, 417 S.E.2d 617, 619 (Ct. App.
1992).

96. S.C.
97. S.C.

CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.

§ 33-43-405(E) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
§ 33-43-401 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
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The second prong of the DeWitt-Sturkie test, requiring that failure to
pierce the veil result in fundamental unfairness, 9 is equally applicable in an
LLC context. "The essence of the fairness test is simply that an individual
cannot be allowed to hide from the normal consequences of carefree
entrepreneuring by doing so through a corporate shell."' To establish this
prong, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the defendant was aware of the
plaintiff's claim against the corporation, and (2) thereafter, the defendant acted
in a self-serving manner with regard to the property of the corporation and in
disregard of the plaintiff's claim to the property."" ° The policy furthered
by this analysis should not be curtailed by use of an LLC and may be
protected by careful application of these standards.
V. CONCLUSION

The Limited Liability Company Act was enacted in order to allow
business venturers to obtain the benefits of partnership taxation and informality, while affording protection from liability for obligations properly incurred
by the company. Failure by the courts to recognize these underlying purposes
and application of too liberal standards for piercing the LLC veil has the
potential to deny this business form its essential benefits. On the other hand,
abuse of this business form by business organizers and legal practitioners may
cause courts to err on the side of safety, thereby establishing precedent to limit
future use of the corporate protection. Until this aspect of the law is clarified,
great caution is warranted from both sides of the bar.
Everett A. Kendall, II

98. Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 457-58, 313 S.E.2d at 318; see also Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that when a corporationbecomes insolvent,
the duty of the directors shifts from the shareholders to the creditors); State v. Hill, 286 S.C.
283, 333 S.E.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the corporate veil may not be used to shield
a director from criminal liability).
, __,431 S.E.2d
99. Multimedia Publishing of South Carolina, Inc. v. Mullins,__ S.C.
569, 573 (1993).
100. Cumberland, 308 S.C. at 272, 417 S.E.2d at 619 (citing Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 459, 313
S.E.2d at 319).
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